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Abstract
We use quantifiers and selection functions to generalize the clas-
sical economic approach to choice. Our framework encompasses pref-
erence and utility based approaches as special cases, but also extends
to non-maximizing behavior and context-dependent motives such as
social concerns. We adapt the method of quantifiers and selection
functions which is based on higher-order functions and originate in
computer science.
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1 Introduction
We use quantifiers and selection functions to generalize the classical economic
approach to choice. The framework we use has been developed as a game
theoretical approach to proof theory1 [6, 7] and we adopt it to economics. We
introduce quantifiers to represent an agent’s goals and selection functions as
the behavior that achieves his goals represented as an algorithm.
As we will show, our framework encompasses preference and utility based
approaches as special cases, with quantifiers representing max and selection
functions arg max. But more importantly, we can go beyond these special
operators. First, it is possible to impose less structure on preferences, as
for instance incompleteness. Secondly, it is possible to consider alternatives
to maximization. Thirdly, goals can be implemented that take not only
the outcomes into consideration but also how outcomes come about from
actions. Our framework based on quantifiers and selection functions provides
a unifying framework for all these concerns.
Quantifers and selection functions are based on the theory of higher-order
functions, which in turn, form the foundation of functional programming
languages. Thus, our framework can be directly implemented in languages
such as Haskell in order to compute choices. The machinery we propose
is readily extendable to interactive situations in a game theoretical setting
which we explore in a companion paper [12]. In the current paper we set the
scene and take a look at the new formalism within the decision theoretical
and non-strategic setting.
The organization of the paper is the following. We first introduce the
formal concept of a quantifier and a selection function. We show that a
utility maximizing agent and his preferences can be instantiated as a special
form of a selection function and quantifier. Then, we show that the selection
function approach can be easily extended to choice behavior not covered by
utility functions. Moreover, we illustrate that selection functions are a very
1Proof theory is a branch of mathematical logic which investigates the structure and
meaning of formal mathematical proofs. It has been recently discovered that certain
proofs of high logical complexity can be interpreted as computer programs which compute
equilibria of suitable generalised games.
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natural way of describing choices in general, be it within the relatively narrow
frame of an only selfish, rational, and materially interested decision-maker
or within alternative settings.
2 Quantifiers and Selection Functions
In this section we give a brief overview of the theory of higher order func-
tions, i.e. functions that take other (possibly higher order) functions as input.
We then use this theory in order to define selection functions and quantifiers.
Subsequently, we represent the classical approach to decision theory via pref-
erence relations and argmax and max operators within the new formalism.
2.1 Higher Order Functions
A higher order function (or functional) is a function whose domain is itself
a set of functions. Given sets X and Y we denote by X → Y the set of
all functions with domain X and codomain Y (this is often denoted Y X
but we avoid this notation). A higher order function is therefore a function
f : (X → Y )→ Z where X, Y and Z are sets.
A simple example of a higher order function is the function that evalulates
its argument at a constant point. To give a specific example, we take the
sets R (real numbers) and Z (integers), and pick a constant real number,
such as pi. We can then define a function Φ : (R→ Z)→ Z by the equation
Φ(f) = f(pi). We can illustrate the behaviour of Φ by giving it a specific
function f : R → Z as an input. For example, let f be the function that
takes a real number to its integer lower bound. The integer lower bound to
pi is 3, therefore Φ(f) = 3.
We will sometimes use a particular notation for higher order functions
called λ-notation. The example above would be written in λ-notation as
Φ = λf.f(pi). The symbol λ denotes the abstraction or binding of the input
to the function, and the name of the variable that is bound is not important,
i.e. λf.f(pi) and λg.g(pi) represent the “same” function. There are familiar
examples of this, for example in the maximum operator the name of the
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variable which ranges over the set X is not relevant, i.e.
max
x∈X
f(x) = max
y∈X
f(y)
and similarly with the variable over which one performs integration, i.e.∫
f(x) dx =
∫
f(y) dy
(we will see later that it is not a coincidence: both of these examples turn out
to be special cases of λ expressions). We sometimes write the domain of the
function as a superscript, as in Φ = λfR→Z.f(pi). λ-notation is also some-
times useful for writing functions which are not higher-order, for example
the function which inputs an integer and squares it can be written λnZ.n2.
It is also possible for the bound variable to not appear in the body of the λ
expression, giving a constant function such as λx.5.
An important result, called combinatory completeness, is that the func-
tions that can be represented only using λ expressions and nothing else are
precisely the computable functions2. That is, λ expressions are a program-
ming language, equivalent in power to Turing machines and other standard
models of computation. However λ expressions have an advantage that it
is easy to extend them with noncomputable functions when necessary (for
example, a λ expression can refer to a known noncomputable function), and
in practice we will do this sometimes. For example, there is a noncomputable
function E which inputs a description of a finite game, and outputs a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of that game. This function can be freely com-
bined with λ expressions, for example λx, y.E(x). However, if we have a
function f which is defined entirely in terms of λ expressions and other func-
tions known to be computable, then we know that f is computable. This has
two important advantages: firstly, we can easily identify which objects we are
2One must distinguish at this point the typed from the untyped λ-calculus. For this
paper we will be mostly working with the typed version, where every term has a precise
type, and an application f(x) is only allowed when f has type X → Y and x has type X, so
that an application such as f(f) is not allowed. However, in order to obtain combinatorial
completeness one needs to work with the untyped λ-calculus, so as to obtain fixed point
operators such as Φ(f) = (λx.f(x(x)))(λx.f(x(x))).
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discussing are computable, and secondly, for those which are computable, we
can see the λ expression as an implementation in a proto-programming lan-
guage which can easily be converted into code of a suitable real programming
language such as Haskell.
2.2 Quantifiers
In this section we will define quantifiers and selection functions as particu-
lar classes of higher order functions. In subsequent sections we will obtain
quantifiers as a series of generalisations from utility functions.
Suppose we have an agent A. We know nothing about A’s motivations,
but we know that it is deterministic (or predictable) in the sense that its
moves are not dependent on chance (this is without loss of generality, be-
cause we can always allow the set of outcomes to be a set of probability
distributions). Consider A as a black box: we can insert it into any situation
and observe what it does.
We need to define what we mean by ‘situation’ here. A situation, which
we will from now on call a context, should be an object that encodes all
of the relevant information that the agent could consider when choosing a
move. Assume our agent is choosing a move in the set X, and the set of
possible final outcomes is R. The context will normally include other agents
and all the other choices that together with the choice of our agent A will
determine a final outcome. If all we care about is the final outcome, then our
context can be modelled simply by a function p : X → R that maps each of
the agent’s move to a specific outcome. In other words, to give the context
of an agent is the same as to define precisely what final outcomes will result
after each of the agent’s choice. That is all that our agent needs to know
about this “context” in order to make the good choice.
Therefore, for an agent choosing a move from a set X, having in sight a
final outcome in a set R, we call any function p : X → R a possible context
for that agent.
Suppose that A makes a decision in the context p. Then the agent will
consider some outcomes to be good (or acceptable), and other outcomes to
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be bad. We are going to allow the set of outcomes that the agent considers
good to be totally arbitrary. Thus, to each context p : X → R, we associate
a set of outcomes ϕ(p) ⊆ R. This defines a higher order function
ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R)
where P(R) is the set of all subsets of R. The function ϕ is precisely what
is known as a quantifier. Considering our discussion above about contexts,
a quantifier can be seen as a description of what the good outcomes are for
each possible context. Our main objective in this paper is to convince the
reader that this is a general, modular, and highly flexible way of describing
an agent’s goal or objective.
For some quantifiers, there will always be exactly one good outcome. This
is the case for our motivating example, which is maximization. Suppose the
set of moves X is finite, and R = R is the real numbers, representing profit.
If a decision is made in the context p : X → R then the good outcome is
precisely the maximal one, i.e. given a context p : X → R, the outcome in
that context which our agent would consider good is the maximum value of
p. Thus our quantifier is defined by the equation
ϕ(p) = {max
x∈X
p(x)}
Often we will omit the set brackets when writing a single-valued quantifier,
so ϕ will be written
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
p(x)
Another common situation is that there is at most one good outcome.
The motivating example for this case is maximization over an infinite set,
such as the unit interval [0, 1]. Then the maximum of p : [0, 1]→ R in general
exists only if p is a continuous function. Thus we can consider a partially
defined quantifier that only chooses good outcomes when given a continuous
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context, i.e.
ϕ(p) =
{maxx∈X p(x)} if p is continuous∅ otherwise
We define the domain of a quantifier ϕ to be the set of all contexts p such that
ϕ(p) is nonempty, that is, p has a good outcome. In symbols the definition
is
dom(ϕ) = {p : X → R | ϕ(p) 6= ∅}
2.3 Selection functions
While considering ‘good’ outcomes may be considered problematic (since
they are subjective to the agent and cannot be observed) there is no problem
in observing the moves made by the agent. If the agent makes a decision in
the context p : X → R then it makes a move x ∈ X. This defines a higher
order function
ε : (X → R)→ X
which we call a selection function. In general, we consider a quantifier to
describe the goals or motivations of the agent (what the agent likes) and a
selection function to describe the behavior of the agent (what she would do to
get what she likes). We can give a very general definition of what it means for
an agent to be rational: their behavior is consistent with their motivation.
For any context, the move they make according to the selection function
should result in a good outcome according to their quantifier. Formally, for
every context p : X → R it should be the case that
p(ε(p)) ∈ ϕ(p)
However if p is a domain with no good outcomes then we cannot expect there
to be a good move. Thus we only require this condition to hold for contexts
p ∈ dom(ϕ). When this is the case we say that the selection function ε
attains the quantifier ϕ. The motivating example of a selection function is
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arg max, which defines the selection function
ε(p) = arg max
x∈X
p(x)
Then ε attains the max quantifier.
Suppose we have a quantifier ϕ which describes the outcomes that an
agent considers to be good. The quantifier might be unrealistic in the sense
that it has no attainable good outcome. For example, in my current context I
would consider it a good outcome if I received a million dollars, but I have no
move at the moment which will lead to this outcome. Given a context p, the
set of attainable outcomes is precisely the image of p. A realistic quantifier
is simply a quantifier in which every context with a good outcome has an
attainable good outcome. We can write it in symbols as
ϕ(p) 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕ(p) ∩ Im(p) 6= ∅.
In fact the following are equivalent:
• ϕ is realistic
• there is a selection function which attains ϕ.
Thus selection functions are a way to describe realistic quantifiers.
The theory of quantifiers and selection functions has been developed in
stages. Selection functions and single-valued quantifiers first appeared in [6],
unifying earlier definitions in proof theory and type theory. The connection
between selection functions and game theory also first appeared there. Gen-
eral quantifiers appeared in [7], which allows us to capture more important
examples in a more natural way. The connections between selection func-
tions and game theory were explored in more depth in [8] and [10], and the
latter contains the definition of attainment given here. Finally [11] contains
the terminology context and the definition of a realistic quantifier.
9
2.4 Context-Independent Quantifiers
Suppose R is the set of possible final outcomes, and each agent i has a partial
order relation i on R, so that x i y means that agent i prefers the outcome
x to y. These partial orders lead to choice functions fi : P(R)→ P(R) where
fi(S) are the maximal elements in the set of possible outcomes S with respect
to the order i. Note that these fi satisfy fi(S) ⊆ S, and fi(S) 6= ∅ for
non-empty S.
Every such fi can be turned into a quantifier ϕi in a generic way, using
the fact that the image operator is a higher-order function Im : (X → R)→
P(R):
(X → R) Im−→ P(R) fi−→ P(R)
so that fi ◦ Im: (X → R) → P(R) are quantifiers. We call quantifiers
factoring as f ◦ Im as context-independent quantifiers. Player’s defined by
context-independent quantifiers are choosing the set of good outcome simply
by ranking the set of outcomes that can be achieved in a given game context.
But are forgetting all the information about how each of the outcomes arise
from particular choices of moves. For instance, we might have a set of actions
that will lead us to earn some large sums of money. Some of these, however,
might be illicit. A maximising agent defined in a context-independent way
would choose the outcome that gives himself the maximum return. If we
have control over which actions lead to which outcomes, we might consider
other choices as preferable.
It is easy to show that whenever fi is a choice function arising from partial
order i, then the a context-independent quantifier fi ◦ Im is realistic, in the
sense of the previous section.
2.4.1 Rational Preferences and Utility Functions as Special Cases
The usual approach to model behavior in economics is to either postulate a
preference relation on the set of alternatives or to directly assume a utility
function [14]. Typically, structure is imposed on preference relations. These
assumptions are made due to two reasons: either because additional structure
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deems to be a characteristic of an agent’s rationality3 or because one wishes
to work with utility functions. It is a classical result that for utility functions
to exist, preferences relations have to be rational [14].
Now, rational preferences and utility functions are special cases of the
generic construction of a context-independent quantifier we outlined in the
last section. They are special because (i) we impose additional structure on
R, that is, i is a total preorder and (ii) we focus on one particular fi, that
is, fi : P(R)→ P(R) defined by
fi(S) = {i -maximal elements of S}
A rational preference relation can always be represented by a utility func-
tion. Translated into the selection function approach, the utility function can
be characterized as the environment which is a mapping p : X → R, attach-
ing a real number to each element of the set of choices X. So, we can define
the quantifier
φ(p) = max p
which is attained by the selection function
ε(p) = arg max p
Note the types φ : (X → R)→ P(R) and ε : (X → R)→ X respectively and
that p(ε(p)) ∈ φ(p). Thus, max and arg max operators, which are universally
used in economic literature, become the prototypical examples of an context-
independent quantifier and a selection function attaining it.
Minimizing Deviations from a Target or Ideal Point Preferences
Another example of a concern which is relevant for economics - in particular
in political economy - is a minimisation of a distance from a target. Such a
concern can be easily represented by a utility function but can be directly
represented by a quantifier as well.
Suppose the outcomes of a decision problem form a set R with a distance
3This issue has been intensely debated, see [17, 15, 14].
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measure d, a metric. For example Rn has a metric given by Euclidean dis-
tance, but there are many other examples including metrics on finite sets.
Suppose the decision maker identifies a set of outcomes S ⊆ R which are con-
sidered to be optimal outcomes. Then the distance of a particular outcome
r to the set S is defined by the equation
d(r, S) = inf
s∈S
d(r, s)
Now the decision maker can choose a move minimising the distance to the
target set:
ϕ(p) = min
x∈X
d(p(x), S)
Although this quantifier can be described by utility functions, it can po-
tentially simplify the modelling of several important situations. For example,
a decision maker focussing only on fairness, at the expense of profit, is equiv-
alent to minimising distance to the diagonal
S = {(x, . . . , x) ∈ Rn | x ∈ R}
2.4.2 Beyond Rational Preferences
The generic construction of context-independent quantifiers instantiates choices
based on rational preferences (or equivalently on utility maximization) as
special cases. In this section we show that we can go beyond these cases by
allowing for a different structure on R or by allowing for a different fi (or by
relaxing both).
Utility functions are considered as a very convenient tool to represent
and analyze choice behavior. Still, the assumption that the preorder is total,
which guarantees the existence of a utility function, is demanding and in fact
more demanding than is necessary to rationalize choice behavior [17]. Sec-
ondly, when taking the perspective of preferences, from a positive as well as
a normative viewpoint, there are good reason why a rational decision-maker
may exhibit “indecisiveness”, meaning that his preference for a pair of out-
comes is not defined [1]. Thirdly, consider a situation where the economist
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or some other agents/principal has only partial information about the pref-
erences of an agent and considers him “as if” he has incomplete preferences
[5]. Lastly, R may be a set of alternatives to be chosen by a group of agents.
Even if each individual’s preferences are complete, the aggregate social wel-
fare ordering does not have to be [16].
There have been various attempts to change standard formalisms to allow
for a utility theory without the need to fulfill the completeness assumption.4
When working with quantifiers and selection functions, the set of out-
comes R can have any order. In particular, the preference relation does not
have to be complete. That is, given any preference relation ⊆ R × R, an
agent chooses the best alternatives as outlined in Section 2.4 above. So, one
can very easily consider choices not in the scope of utility functions without
the need to change the framework.
2.4.3 Beyond Maximization and Standard Rationality
The utility approach is intimately linked to the assumption that the agent
fully optimizes. The behavioral economic literature as well as the psycho-
logical literature have documentated deviations from optimizing behavior,
and have collected various decision “heuristics” [3, 13]. Quantifiers provide
a nice way to model such deviations. Morover, even situations that can be
modelled with utility functions may have (more) natural representations in
the quantifier framework.
Decisions Heuristic Consider a simple heuristic of a person ordering wine
in a restaurant. Suppose he always chooses the second most-expensive wine.
In terms of selection functions, let X be the set of wines available in a restau-
rant, and p : X → R the price attached to each wine xi (i = 1, ..., N) on
the menu. Denote with ri the price of wine xi. Given a maximal chain
rn > rn−1 > . . . > r1 in R, let us call rn−1 a sub-maximal element. The
4For an important early contribution see [1]. More recent contributions include [16]
for utility representations in certain environments and [5] for uncertain environments. See
also references in [16].
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“goal” of the agent can be described by the quantifier
φ>(p
X→R) = {sub-maximal elements with respect to > within img(p)}.
Such quantifiers are attainable with selection function
ε>(p
X→R) = any x such that p(x) is a sub-maximal element of img(p)
since clearly p(ε>(p)) ∈ φ>(p).
2.5 Context-Dependent Quantifiers
So far, we have focused only on the generic context-independent quantifier.
As the last examples illustrate with this construction we can already go
beyond choices motivated by rational preferences. Yet, we can do more. We
can allow for quantifiers that do not only take the image of p as input but
the complete function. Next, we provide several examples to illustrate that
this opens up a complete new dimension. Indeed, with context-dependent
quantifiers it is possible to go far beyond what can be modelled using utility
functions.
Majority and minority The majority quantifier selects outcomes which
are “most unavoidable”. Given a function p : X → R, where X and R are
finite sets, we can rank the elements r ∈ R by number of different way it can
be achieved:
nr = |{x ∈ X | p(x) = r}|
If some r has nr > nr′ for all r
′ 6= r then we can say that r is the most
unavoidable outcome. If there is a tie we can simply select the set of all
outcomes which are tied for most unavoidable. This defines a quantifier
ϕ : (X → R) → P(R), which is attained by a selection function because
we only consider outcomes in the image of p. Technically, this quantifier
depends on the multiset image of p: not just which outcomes are attainable,
but how many ways they can be attained. Later we will consider quantifiers
even more general than depending on the multiset image of p.
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To illustrate this quantifier, suppose there are 3 identical beaches, and the
agent is indifferent between them. The first can be reached by one highway,
the second by two highways and the third by three highways. The agent
must choose which highway to take, and the outcome is the beach that the
agent goes to. The agent decides to visit the beach which can be reached by
the most different routes, which is the third, for example to avoid the risk of
being stuck in a traffic jam.
Just as easily we can define the minority quantifier, which selects the set
of all outcomes that are easiest to avoid, as they have the least number of
moves which lead to them (ignoring outcomes which are never chosen).
Average Given a finite set X and a function p : X → R, the average value
of p is given by the quantifier
ϕ(p) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
p(x)
Unfortunately this quantifier is not realistic. However if we replace X with
the unit interval [0, 1] then the average value of a continuous function p :
[0, 1]→ R is given by the integral
ϕ(p) =
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx
Moreover there is a selection function which attains this quantifier, since by
the mean value theorem for every continuous function p : [0, 1] → R there
always exists a point a such that
p(a) =
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx
Fixed points Consider an agent who is part of a group that has to choose
an element of out of a set X. Assume that he observes the choices of other
people and wants to make the same choice that the majority makes. One
example for such goals is Keynes’s Beauty contest where the agent is only
interested in voting for the winner of the contest and he has no preferences
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for the contestants per se. The set of all possible choices that can be made
by the group is Xn, and the outcome of the contest is the majority function
maj : Xn → X which selects the most common element of the tuple (this
outcome function should not be confused with the majority quantifier con-
sidered above, which is different). Thus the outcome is the most popular
choice.
The agent in the Keynes beauty contest can be described by a quantifier
which is a fixed point operator. Let X be any set. A fixed point of a function
f : X → X is a point x ∈ X satisfying the equation f(x) = x. We can define
a multi-valued quantifier ϕ : (X → X) → P(X) which selects the set of all
fixed points of a function:
ϕ(p) = {x ∈ X | p(x) = x}
In practice, most functions do not have a fixed point and so this quantifier
will often give the empty set. For the purposes of modelling a particular
situation we might want to ‘complete’ ϕ in different ways, describing what
an agent might do in the event that no fixed point exists. The simplest
situation is that we fix a ‘default option’ x0 ∈ X, and define a multi-valued
quantifier by
ϕ(p) =
{x ∈ X | p(x) = x} if p has a fixed point{x0} otherwise
There are other possibilities, such as the agent having a preference ordering
on X and choosing the maximum in the event of there being no fixed point.
Suppose the other votes (x2, . . . , xn) are fixed, so the context of the agent’s
move is λx1.maj(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Thus the agent will aim to find an x1 that
satisfies the equation
x1 = maj(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
where the decisions x2, ..., xn are exogenously given. The situation becomes
far more interesting when considered as a game in which several agents are
voting. We analyse this in detail in the follow-up paper [12].
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Another possibility is to work in an alternative foundation to set theory,
such as domain theory or a specific programming language, in which every
function has a canonical fixed point. Such a foundation relies on every set
having an element ⊥, which represents a computer program which does not
terminate. Such an element can be interpreted as the ‘move’ of an agent who
is indecisive. We leave this discussion for future work.
2.6 Trading off between selection functions and con-
text
Modelling a decision problem using a selection function introduces an ad-
ditional degree of freedom over utility functions, namely we can trade off
between a selection function and a context. Suppose we have a set of moves
X, a set of outcomes R and a context p : X → R. Consider an agent who
acts according to the selection function ε : (X → R) → X, so the move the
agent will make in this particular situation is ε(p).
However, we can model the same situation in a different way. Suppose the
set of outcomes is also X, and the context is the identity function X → X, so
the outcome of a move is the move itself. Now consider a selection function
δ : (X → X)→ X defined by
δ(id) = ε(p ◦ id)
The move made by an agent playing this selection function is
δ(id) = ε(p ◦ id) = ε(p)
Thus we have moved all the information encoded by the context ‘inside’ the
selection function δ.
In the other direction, when we have a selection function that can be
modelled using utility functions then we can move some of the information
contained in the selection function into the context, which is the utility func-
tion, reducing the selection function to arg max at the expense of a more
complicated context. This can be used to characterise the quantifiers that
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are equivalent to utility functions.
Usually there will be an infinite variety of ways to make this trade off. To
some extent this also occurs when considering interactions between several
agents.
In practice we resolve this by using selection functions and contexts to
model different aspects. Roughly speaking, quantifiers and selection func-
tions should be used to model what is intrinsic to the agent, while contexts
should be used to model what is intrinsic to the situation. So long as the
move sets and outcome sets are equal we can then consider different agents
making the same decision, and the same agent making different decisions.
A simple example of this is modelling fairness concerns, which we consider
in the next section. What is intrinsic to the situation is the amount of profit
that the agent receives. What is intrinsic to the agent is whether the agent
cares only about profit or will take fairness into consideration. A suitable
context is p : X → Rn, where the tuple p(x) represents the profits received
by n recipients after the move x. An agent who cares only about his own
profit p(x)i will use the quantifier
ϕi(p) = max
x∈X
p(x)i
An agent who cares only about fairness will use the quantifier
ϕj(p) = min
x∈X
f(p(x))
where f : Rn → R is a function that the agent uses to measure the unfairness
of an outcome. We can then consider different agents who measure unfairness
by different criteria. In the next section we will consider ways of combining
these quantifiers to take both concerns into consideration.
3 Combining Quantifiers
Quantifiers allow for a flexible modelling of choice behavior. But there is the
additional important aspect of compositionality. We can combine different
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agents/goals into new agents/goals by building the product of quantifiers.
Thereby we can make explicit the way in which differing motives interact.
In this section, we show the general approach to composition and we apply
it to an example where an agent cares for his and another agents’ payoffs.
There is one important way of combining single-valued quantifiers, called
the product of quantifiers, and a corresponding operation on selection func-
tions called the product of selection functions. These are central to the ap-
plications of selection functions to proof theory [6], but as they are closely
connected to extensive-form games of complete information we will not con-
sider them in this paper. Another method of combining selection functions
appears in [10], called the binary Berardi-Bezem-Coquand functional, is also
directly based on the needs of proof theory and is connected to normal-form
games, so they will also not be considered.
3.1 Example: Social Preferences
A standard assumption in economics is that people are selfish. Accordingly,
they only care for their own private benefit. However, experimental evidence
as well as evidence from the field indicates that individuals regularly deviate
from selfish decisions. The evidence has triggered a theoretical literature
which tries to incorporate social concerns into agents’ motivation. We will
focus on this example here. Our approach is not limited to this particular
application but we consider the issue of social preferences to by prototypical.
A prominent class of models assumes that individuals take the allocative
consequences of their decisions for others into account [2, 4, 9]. Consider a
set of agents {1, ..., N}. One agent, 1, has to make a decision x ∈ X which
potentially influences the outcomes R for all agents. The type of outcomes
is then R = R1 × · · · ×RN .
The models of [2, 4, 9] are restrictive in two dimensions. First, they focus
only on outcomes which involve monetary transfers, that is Ri = R. Secondly,
they only consider standard utility functions. Hence, they are restricted to
depict social behavior by agents as a maximization of some utility function,
usually of the following form: U(r1, ..., rN) = f(r1) + g(r1, ..., rN), where
19
ri ∈ Ri for all i and the functional form of f and g depends on the motives
of agent i.
3.1.1 Social Concerns I
Suppose we have n agents, together with one benevolent agent who must
choose a move in a set X. We can describe the goals of this agent by a
quantifier ϕ : (X → Rn) → Rn. A simple situation is that the agent moves
to maximise the sum of all payoffs (see, for instance [4]):
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
n∑
i=1
p(x)i
However we can just as easily describe more complex behaviors for the agent,
for example minimising inequality.
3.1.2 Social Concerns II
Consider an agent be interested in both a fair allocation and in maximizing
his payoffs. Suppose he must make a move which determines a split of a fixed
pie pi between himself and another recipient5, so the context is p : X → R2.
Hence, if the agents decides to allocate x to himself, then the recipient receives
pi − x. So, it holds that p(x) = (x, pi − x).
Suppose we consider the agent to have two aspects to his personality,
one which cares only about profit and one which cares only about fairness.
In general, such an agent may have a pair of quantifiers ϕ, ψ : (X → R) →
P(R). After making a move in the context p, the ‘first personality’ is satisfied
with those outcomes in ϕ(p), and the ‘second personality’ is satisfied with
those outcomes in ψ(p). Therefore the moves which satisfy both personality
aspects are precisely the elements of ϕ(p) ∩ ψ(p). This is captured by a new
quantifier ϕ ∩ ψ by
(ϕ ∩ ψ)(p) = ϕ(p) ∩ ψ(p)
5In the literature, this type of situation is often referred to as a “Dictator Game”. See
[3] for an overview of the empirical evidence.
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However typically this new quantifier will not be realistic, even if ϕ and ψ are
both realistic. Therefore the agent will often face a conflict between the two
aspects of his personality. Thus, we have to resort to resolving the conflict
in different ways for each agent and for each situation.
In our specific example, the first personality cares only about own payoff,
and so uses the single-valued quantifier
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
p(x)1
Suppose the second personality has identified a set of outcomes F ⊆ R2
which are deemed to be fair. The second personality is then satisfied with
any fair outcome:
ψ(p) = F
One way in which the agent may resolve the conflict is to choose a maximal
fair outcome:
χ(p) = max(F ∩ Im(p))1
For a pair of selection functions (or single-valued quantifiers) there is a
very general way of resolving the conflict by introducing an ‘arbiter’. Suppose
the agent consists of a committee of two decision-makers, each of which
suggests a course of action. The committee members are described by the
selection functions ε, δ : (X → R)→ X, so given the context p : X → R the
first member will suggest the move ε(p) and the second will suggest the move
δ(p). The arbiter will decide based on the outcomes which would result from
these moves.
In general, the arbiter will be described by a binary relation A on R. If
the moves suggested are x1 and x2 respectively, the arbiter will check whether
the relation (x1, pi − x1)A(x2, pi − x2) holds. If it does, the move x1 will be
selected, otherwise the move x2 will be selected.
In our example, there are several criteria which the arbiter could use to se-
lect moves. For example, there could be a maximum amount of profit c which
is considered acceptable to lose in the name of fairness. Then given outcomes
(x1, pi − x1) /∈ F and (x2, pi − x2) ∈ F , the relation (x1, pi − x1)A(x2, pi − x2)
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will hold iff the loss incurred by the fair outcome is too great, that is,
(x1, pi − x1)A(x2, pi − x2) ⇐⇒ x1 − x2 > c
Another possibility is to use lexicographic preferences, in which case
(x1, pi − x1)A(x2, pi − x2) holds iff one of the following holds:
• (x1, pi−x1) ∈ F and (x2, pi−x2) /∈ F (prefer a fair outcome to an unfair
one)
• (x1, pi − x1) ∈ F ⇐⇒ (x2, pi − x2) ∈ F and x1 ≥ x2 (all other things
equal, prefer greater profit)
We can consider an arbiter to be unbiased if the result does not depend
on the order of ε and δ, which is equivalent to the formal condition of anti-
symmetry: x1Ax2 holds iff x2Ax1 does not hold. This method thus allows us
to consider biased arbiters, by considering relations which are not antisym-
metric. There is also no formal need to require that A is transitive. For any
arbiter A, the resulting behavior of the agent as a whole is described by the
selection function
ε′(p) =
ε(p) if p(ε(p))Ap(δ(p))δ(p) otherwise
4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we propose the use of quantifiers and selection functions to
model individual choices. Our framework instantiates the standard approach
in economics, preferences and utility functions, as one special case. In our
framework we can also model agents whose preferences are incomplete, who
deviate from maximization, whose motives are not only influenced by the
outcome but also by the way outcomes realize, or any combination thereof.
Typically, economists restrict themselves to choice settings where an equiv-
alence between the preference and the utility maximization approach holds
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[14]. In practice, this results in the tendency to use utility functions which ex-
cludes interesting choice phenomena from analysis. Quantifiers and selection
functions provide means to address such phenomena.
Even when considering questions in the realm of the standard framework,
where formal equivalence between different approaches exists, the natural-
ness of one form versus the other may be different. While representing choice
problems as a maximization problem of a utility function is typically consid-
ered to be advantageous as the mathematical toolbox economists are used
to can be applied, representing choices in a different form may be more nat-
ural and more insightful nevertheless. With the developments in modern
theoretical computer science many of the supposedly benefits of sticking to
optimization methods deem less advantageous to us.
Our approach is based on higher-order functions which also form the
foundation for high-level functional programming languages. The idea be-
hind these languages is that they represent mathematical objects themselves.
Having common ground has the consequences that the models within our
framework are implementable in these languages.
Lastly, the roots of the quantifier and selection functions approach with
respect to economics are in game theory, that is, interaction between different
agents. What we have presented in this paper is readily extended to interac-
tions. It is here, where we think the expressiveness of this approach as well
as its implementability in programming languages will come to particular
fruition.
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